Post-quantum readiness: What digital asset custodians can do today
Post-quantum readiness starts with understanding today’s cryptographic dependencies and planning for change.
November 2026
Barbara Widholm
Vice President, Emerging Technologies, State Street
Prabhjot Singh Bajwa
Senior Digital Assets Risk Officer, State Street
Dr. Nicolas Bonvin
Chief Technology Officer, Taurus SA
Quantum computing has attracted growing attention, and recent announcements from Microsoft, IBM, and NVIDIA have renewed scrutiny of the technology as development accelerates.
At State Street, we hosted an educational webinar in May to discuss the potential implications of these developments for the investment industry. As questions grow about quantum computing’s potential to challenge existing cybersecurity mechanisms, financial institutions need to consider how they can best prepare while the technology continues to evolve.
Following this year’s launch of our Digital Assets Platform with technology partner Taurus SA, this article examines the implications of quantum computing for on-chain assets and secure cryptographic custody. It also outlines practical steps financial services organizations can take today.
It’s important to note that quantum computing does not make financial infrastructure suddenly unsafe. However, it does challenge some of the assumptions behind the public-key cryptography that financial institutions and digital asset markets rely on.
No machine capable of breaking real-world cryptography exists today, and the timeline for such a development remains uncertain. Rather than trying to predict when that might happen, institutions should focus on what they can do now to prepare.
A foundation is already in place. In 2024, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) finalized its first post-quantum standards: ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key establishment, and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) for digital signatures. NIST’s draft transition guidance also points to 2030 and 2035 milestones for moving away from widely used quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms.
Similar preparations are underway in several other markets. The European Union has outlined a Quantum Europe Strategy and plans to introduce the Quantum Act to strengthen the region’s quantum ecosystem. In the UK, the National Cyber Security Centre has published post-quantum migration guidance and established milestones for organizations to plan and complete their transition. The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore has published guidance and support for firms seeking to understand their quantum security readiness. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has published a banking-sector quantum preparedness white paper and introduced a Quantum Preparedness Index to support the industry’s transition.
For institutions, these developments bring three considerations into focus: where the risk sits, which parts of the infrastructure they can address themselves, and whether their custody architecture can adapt as standards and blockchain protocols evolve.
Start with the risks that matter now
Quantum exposure comes in two forms, each operating on different timelines.
Confidentiality risk already exists: Encrypted information can be captured today and stored until a sufficiently capable quantum computer becomes available, a scenario often called “harvest now, decrypt later.” This makes long-lived client data, sensitive communications, and backups an important part of post-quantum planning now.
Signature risk comes later: Quantum computing could eventually undermine the algorithms used to authenticate users and authorize transactions, including blockchain transactions. The main concern is future authorization once the required quantum capability exists. For some blockchain addresses, the public key may become permanently visible on-chain once it is exposed through a transaction, creating a related long-term vulnerability that institutions should consider when assessing signature risk.
This gives institutions a clear sequence: protect long-lived confidential information now, while preparing signing infrastructure to migrate as standards and networks evolve.
It is also important to distinguish public-key cryptography from other forms of cryptography. Symmetric algorithms such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and modern hash functions are not affected in the same way as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) encryption and elliptic-curve cryptography, and where they are, the impact is more manageable. Post-quantum migration is primarily a public-key cryptography challenge.
Focus on what institutions can control
Once the risks have been identified, the next question is how much of the transition an institution can manage itself.
Financial institutions can upgrade secure connections, authentication, internal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), backups, and other parts of their infrastructure on their own timetable. Blockchain transaction signatures create a different dependency.
A blockchain determines which signature schemes it accepts. A custodian may use a hardware security module (HSM), multi-party computation (MPC), or another signing architecture, but the resulting signature must still follow the rules of the underlying network. A custodian therefore cannot make a public blockchain post-quantum secure on its own.
New transaction signatures require protocol changes and coordination across developers, node operators, wallets, custodians, and users. Work on potential migration paths is already underway, including dedicated post-quantum research within the Ethereum ecosystem, along with similar statements of intent from Stellar and Solana.
For institutions, the implication is clear: protect what you control, maintain cryptographic flexibility, and be ready to adopt new signature standards when the underlying networks support them.
This makes the design of the custody architecture itself an important part of post-quantum readiness.
Understand how your custody architecture can migrate
Financial institutions commonly rely on HSMs, MPC, or a combination of controls. These are established approaches to digital asset custody, but their levels of post-quantum readiness differ.
HSM-based architectures currently have a more direct migration path for post-quantum signatures. Some HSM vendors have begun supporting standardized post-quantum algorithms within the protected hardware boundary, subject to firmware, implementation, validation, and certification requirements.
For MPC, support depends more heavily on the mathematical structure of the specific signature scheme. A suitable distributed protocol needs to exist for each scheme, and maturity varies significantly. Some lattice-based schemes, such as ML-DSA, are more amenable to MPC, while others can be considerably harder to support efficiently. Certain hash-based signatures present more fundamental challenges, as highlighted by research presented through NIST.
The key consideration is therefore not simply whether an architecture is “post-quantum ready.” Institutions should understand which specific algorithms it can support, how mature that support is, and what migration would require if an underlying blockchain adopts a different scheme. These considerations should be integrated into existing technology and risk-management processes.
What financial institutions can do now
Post-quantum readiness does not require institutions to replace custody infrastructure today. Instead, five actions can provide a practical starting point:
Build a cryptographic inventory: Identify where public-key cryptography is used across custody, authentication, networks, backups, application programming interfaces (APIs), and third-party systems.
Prioritize by risk: Start with long-lived confidential information and systems that will be difficult to migrate.
Assess vendor readiness: Confirm which specific post-quantum algorithms providers can support, how mature and certified that support is, and what migration would require.
Maintain a migration roadmap: Track relevant standards, vendor capabilities, blockchain developments, and support for post-quantum algorithms across specific HSM and MPC providers as part of ongoing risk management. Establish measurable milestones such as inventory coverage, the percentage of critical systems assessed, vendor responses received, remediation plans approved, pilots completed, and unresolved exceptions.
Establish governance and ownership: Assign executive ownership, establish decision rights, secure funding, define reporting requirements, and connect the work to cybersecurity, resilience, procurement, and third-party risk.
Prepare for a transition rather than a deadline
Post-quantum migration will not happen everywhere at once. Classical and post-quantum cryptography are likely to coexist for years as financial institutions, technology providers, and blockchain networks move at different speeds.
The objective today is not to declare an institution completely “quantum-safe.” It is to identify cryptographic dependencies, reduce risks that can already be addressed, and ensure the architecture can evolve with the technology and broader ecosystem.